to supply a single unit of a commodity was awarded to the low bidder using a first-price, sealed-bid institution. The actual cost of producing the item, C, was unknown at the time bids were submitted. The low bidder earned a profit equal to the difference between his bid and the actual cost of supplying the item; all other bidders earned zero profits.
C was drawn randomly from a uniform distribution on [$50 .00, $250.00]. Each bidder received a private information signal, ci, randomly drawn from a uniform distribution on [C-c, C+ e]. The distributions underlying both C and the private information signals were common knowledge as was c and the number of bidders, N.
To cover the possibility of losses subjects were given starting capital credit balances of at least $ Io.oo. Losses were subtracted from this balance and profits added to it. Subjects were told that if this balance wen,t to zero or less that they would no longer be allowed to participate. After all bids were submitted they were posted along with the corresponding signal values, and the low bid noted. C was announced and profits (or losses) were calculated and balances updated. Each period the profit or loss earned was announced, but not the identity of the low bidder.
Experiments 1-3 employed 4 active bidders throughout. Experiment 4 began with 4 active bidders; after 24 periods bidding was done in markets with N = 7 both with and without public information which consisted of announcing the highest cost estimate (CH) received by an active bidder.2 Profits were paid in only one of the two markets. The market paid was determined randomly. However this expectation is naive in that it fails to account for the fact that the 2 Two experienced student subjects were added to the five executives to create a market with N= 7.
Unfortunately there is no clear cut prediction as to the effects of risk aversion on the equilibrium bid function. Depending on the nature and degree of the risk aversion, equilibrium bids could be greater than or less than the SRNNE. where c1 refers to the lowest signal. Given symmetry (or a high rank order correlation between bids and signals) in bidding, winning bids less than (3) will result in losses on average. Note that there are two opposing forces at work when the number of bidders is increased in a CVA. There is a strategic force which tends to promote lower bidding as the number of bidders increases: With a greater number of rivals there is less room to markup bids relative to cost estimates and still win the auction. However item valuation considerations promote higher bidding: The adverse selection problem is greater the higher the number of bidders. Given the distributions in our design, the item valuation force dominates the strategic force, and the SRNNE requires that individual bids be constant or increasing as N increases (see (i)).
Milgrom and Weber (I982) extend the CVA model developed by Wilson.
They show that in a high price auction, the release of public information regarding the true value of the item will raise seller's revenues on average. The analogous effect here is that the release of public information regarding the true cost of the item will lower the offer price, thus lowering bidder's profits. Note that this is an equilibrium prediction. If the market is characterised by the winner's curse, i.e. below normal or negative profits, then the release of public information may have the effect of increasing the low bid, as bidders utilise the additional information to avoid the valuation errors which underlie the winner's curse.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

A. Experiments with N = 4
Fig. I shows the market outcomes, by period, for experiment 4 (the executives). The actual profits earned along with the SRNNE predicted profits are shown for each period. Negative or near zero profits dominate; there appears to be little evidence of systematic learning over time within the experiment. A similar absence of within experiment learning is reported for the student subjects (Dyer, I 987). Table I begins our comparison of subject populations. The second column reports the percentage of auction periods in which the low bid was submitted by the lower signal holder. Columns 3 and 4 report average actual profits earned and average profits predicted by the SRNNE, respectively. The fifth and sixth columns report the percentage of times the low bid was less than (3), the expected cost conditional on having received the lowest estimate and the percentage of all bids that were less than this conditional expectation.
Regarding (47/96) * All subjects had no prior laboratory experience except for two subjects in experiment 2 who had participated in experiment i. Since there were 7 subjects present for experiment 2 we believe any effects of these subjects' prior experience to be negligible. t Experiments i and 2 began with 2 dry runs, experiment 3 with 3 dry runs, and Experiment 4 with I dry run. These periods are deleted from the analysis. + In Exp. i e = 6 in periods i-6, e = I2 in 7-I6 and 24-27, and e = 24 in I7-23.
In Exp. 2 e = 6 in periods i-6, e = I2 in 7-I6 and 25-34, and e = 24 in I7-24.
In Exp. 3 e = 6 in periods I-7, 6 = I2 in 8-i8 and 3I-35, and 6 = 24 in I9-30. In Exp. 4 e = 6 in periods i-6, e = I2 in 7-I8 and 25-36, and 6 = 24 in I-24 and 37-40. ? The starting capital balance was $io.oo in Exp. i and 2 and $20.00 in Exp. 3. Exp. 4 began with a capital balance of $20.00. When N was increased from 4 to 7 each subject was given a new capital balance of $25.00, with the understanding that the ending balances from part one of the experiment would be added to the ending balances from part two and paid in cash at the end of the experiment.
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THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [MARCH experiment. We find no significant differences, at the i % level or better, across populations in any of the following measures of market performance: the percentage of times the low bid was submitted by the low signal holder, average actual profits and the percentage of times the low bid was less than (3). Finally, at an individual level we find no difference in the percentage of all bids less than (3). More detailed analysis of the data reveals some differences however. The student subject experiments show a pattern of decreasing losses as e increases from 6 to I 2, with positive profits as e increases from I 2 to 24. When e is returned to I 2 losses again dominate. The executives show a different pattern, with modest losses at e = 6, which increases as e increases.
Regression analysis on individual bid functions shows that the students employed a larger fixed markdown and were morejresponsive to changes in e than the executives. We believe these different bidding rules may be reflective of underlying differences in risk attitudes between the two groups, with the students exhibiting risk aversion and the executives risk neutrality. The latter argument is supported by the fact that with increases in e, cost estimates are less precise, which, other things equal, is likely to be reflected in proportionately greater markups in bids relative to signal values for risk averse bidders. Further, it seems reasonable to assume that the executives would be closer to risk neutrality, especially over the sums at stake in these auctions, than the student subjects. In either case, we see a somewhat different pattern of bidding with changing e across the two subject populations (see Dyer, i987, for a more complete discussion).
The different pattern of profits/losses with changes in e, and the differences in estimated bid functions, lead us to reject the maintained hypothesis that there are no differences between the two subject pools; however, we feel that the similarities are much more striking than the differences. Table 2 reports the results of changing N in experiment 4. Losses dominate with both N = 4 and N = 7 for both e = I 2 and e = 24 and increase as N increases. Increasing losses with increased numbers of rivals implies that individual bidders are responding in the wrong direction, or are not responding sufficiently in the right direction, to overcome the increased adverse selection problem and may well represent a difference between the two subject pools. However this conclusion is not without qualification. The student experiments involved experienced subjects who were making relatively large positive average profits in markets with N -4 when the number of bidders increased, while the executives were suffering losses when we increased market size from 4 to 7 bidders. Coming from the domain of positive profits, the students may have been more sensitive to the strategic pressures of changing N than the item valuation forces, which would lead them to bid more aggressively when the number of rivals increased. The executives however, coming from the domain of negative profits, may have been more responsive to the item valuation forces. Given that they were already suffering from the winner's curse, when N increased simple survival pressures dictated bidding less aggressively to avoid bankruptcy, and exit from the market. These differences in context provide an alternative explanation to the observed behavioural differences than any fundamental difference between the two subject pools. Table 3 reports the results of announcing CH, the highest private information signal received by an active bidder, on the offer price. Pooled over the I I observations, public information raised the offer price by $2.9I (t = I.87 significant at the 5 00 level, 2-tailed test). This is contrary to the theoretical prediction of a decrease in the offer price of $i.6o but is consistent with earlier findings with student subjects (Kagel and Levin, I986). The perverse effects of public information relative to Nash equilibrium bidding theory generalise from students to the executives and from a bid to an offer auction institution.
B. Effects of Changing N and Public Information
IV. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Our experiments show that the judgmental failure known as the winner's curse, which has been documented in laboratory high price auction experiments, extends to an offer auction institution. Further, results with inexperienced bidders in large markets extend to small markets, as a strong and persistent winner's curse was found when bidding was done in markets with only four bidders. Finally similar results are reported almost without exception across students and business executives. We conclude that the winner's curse phenomenon is robust across auction form, market size and subject population. The results for the executives seem most surprising given their experience bidding in a market presumed to have a strong common value component. In reporting these surprising results two recurring issues have been raised: (i) the executives may not have been taking the experiment seriously, with bidding done more or less at random, and/or (2) there may be institutional factors which protect overly aggressive low price bidders from suffering losses in the field. We now address these two issues.
